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Abstract
The Chinese national government has put energy efficiency 
and pollution control at the heart of its 11th five-year plan 
(2005-2010). However, implementation of national policies at 
the local level is notoriously poor in China. In order to tackle 
this problem, voluntary agreements were signed between local 
Environmental Protection Bureaus and 14 mostly state-owned 
companies from different energy-intensive sectors in Nanjing, 
Xi’an and Kelamayi in the context of an ongoing EU-funded 
pilot project. In Nanjing, for instance, agreed targets are in the 
range of a 3-5% reduction in energy intensity by 2009 over a 
2007 baseline. The pilot agreements are informed by Dutch 
experiences with long-term agreements on energy efficiency 
(LTA/1989-1999) as European best practice, but have been sig-
nificantly adjusted to Chinese circumstances. Much emphasis 
was put on process management applying a cooperative ap-
proach throughout. Each enterprise put together a so-called 
Energy Action Team for voluntary agreement development and 
implementation. This helped to create a sense of ownership in 
the companies and assigned clear responsibilities. Energy Ac-
tion Teams conducted Energy Potential Scans in cooperation 
with a Dutch expert to identify energy saving potentials and 
possible measures to realize them. On this basis, achievable tar-
gets were agreed and a detailed action plan was developed. A 
first evaluation is scheduled for April 2009. By lifting industry 
on a more equal power level with government authorities, vol-
untary agreements showed to be an effective policy instrument 
to overcome traditional institutional constraints to environ-
mental policy implementation at the local level in China.
Introduction: Industrial Energy Efficiency in 
China
China is by now the biggest CO2 emitter (MNP, 2007; IEA, 2007) 
and the second largest energy consumer (IEA, 2007) in the 
world. Still China experiences serious energy shortages, while 
suffering from local air pollution (OECD, 2007) not least due 
to a 76.4% reliance on coal in primary energy terms. This 
dire situation has prompted the Chinese government to put 
energy efficiency at the top of the agenda. Highest levels of 
Government have set an energy intensity reduction target of 
20% and a pollution reduction target of 10% by 2010 against 
a 2005 baseline in the 11th Five Year Plan (FYP), 2006-2010. 
The coming into effect of the amended energy conservation 
law in April 2008 has further increased the pressure to im-
prove energy efficiency on all levels of government, as well as 
on stat-owned enterprises. Chinese national environmental 
policies have long been characterised by a top-down regulative 
approach. Despite recognition of environmental problems on 
higher levels, implementation at the local level is notoriously 
poor (Yang, 2004). This issue has also been recognised by the 
Chinese leadership, which is now striving for “institutional in-
novation” and new policy mechanisms – also mentioning vol-
untary agreements amongst those instruments that need to be 
strengthened (NDRC, 2007a: 31). 
In this context, transfer of policy innovations from indus-
trialized countries is considered and foreign experiences with 
voluntary agreements are taken into account (see for example 
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Price et al., 2003) and adapted to local circumstances. Pilot 
projects involving foreign expertise play an important role 
in adapting policies to the Chinese context. As only few pi-
lot projects exist so far, experiences from Nanjing, Xi’an and 
Kelamayi, where voluntary agreements were signed between 
energy-intensive enterprises and local Environmental Protec-
tion Bureaus (EPBs), can significantly inform the future de-
velopment of voluntary agreements throughout China. Con-
sequently, this paper explores the institutional setting for the 
emergence of voluntary agreements and the more specific 
drivers of the actors involved, as well as the agreed targets and 
procedures including a section on the possibilities to finance 
voluntary agreements through the Clean Development Mecha-
nism to give a comprehensive overview of our pilot action. By 
this means, this paper is an attempt to contribute to the urgent 
need to explore new instruments for environmental manage-
ment in China focusing on actor constellations and manage-
ment aspects of voluntary agreements at the local level. 
Background: Institutional setting
Local EPBs implement national environmental policies and 
programmes that are designed by the Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (MEP), formerly the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) (Ma and Ortolano, 2000), as 
well as local environmental policies. Energy efficiency, howev-
er, falls within the responsibility of the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is responsible for en-
ergy and economic policies. Hence, at the local level normally 
Development and Reform Commissions (DRCs) are in charge 
of energy policy. A similar vertical relationship exists between 
local branches of state-owned companies and their parent com-
panies on the national level (see figure 1). For instance, national 
state-owned companies require their local branches to achieve 
often very ambitious energy efficiency requirements. 
Instead of providing detailed implementation guidelines, 
MEP has always encouraged local innovation so that in some 
cities only informal contracts between EPBs and managers of 
enterprises were put in place. These informal rules of behav-
iour form part of the institutional framework of environmental 
management in China (Ma and Ortolano, 2000) and reflect a 
consensus-oriented interaction between authorities and (state-
owned) industry. They could perhaps even be interpreted as 
an informal prototype of voluntary agreements. EPBs operate 
under the control of local government via so-called kuai-kuai-
relations. They receive most of their funding from local govern-
ment, which also holds the power to appoint or remove EPB 
directors. Whereas EPBs are concerned with implementing 
MEP policies on environmental protection, local governments’ 
priority remains economic development securing employment 
and revenues. EPBs thus find themselves in a difficult situa-
tion, basically implementing national environmental regula-
tions within the leeway given to them by local government. 
This conflict of actors’ orientations hampers the effective imple-
mentation of environmental policies, because, being dependent 
on local governments, EPBs cannot be expected to regularly act 
against their will (Jahiel, 1998). However, Nanjing is a special 
case in that it holds the Environmental Model City status, which 
is awarded to those cities that achieve higher environmental 
Figure 1. Simplified Institutional Set-up. Source: adapted from Eichhorst and Bongardt (in press) 
PANEL 5: ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND INDUSTRY
%#%%%  35--%2 345$9 s ACT! INNOVATE! DELIVER! REDUCING ENERGY DEMAND SUSTAINABLY 1041 
5012 BONGARDT, EICHHORST

standards than generally required. Since this award represents 
a gain in social status (mianzi) for the local government, it is a 
real incentive to achieve better environmental quality. 
Case study: Voluntary Agreements in Nanjing, 
Xi’an and Kelamayi
Pressing environmental concerns, as well as environmental 
education of one of the experts from Nanjing Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) lead to the idea of transferring good 
practice from Europe to Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. The Dutch 
energy agency, the main implementing body of voluntary 
agreements in The Netherlands, was also interested in dissemi-
nating good practice results to China and applied for a grant 
in the AsiaProEco programme by the European Union. After a 
first project phase (2004-2005) under AsiaProEco I, in which 
a feasibility study on voluntary approaches for urban environ-
mental management was conducted in Nanjing and a model 
for voluntary agreements for Chinese local governments was 
developed (Nanjing EPB, 2005), the European Union decided 
to fund a three-year demonstration project with 14 compa-
nies from Nanjing, Xi’an and Kelamayi. Voluntary agreements 
were signed between the three local Environmental Protection 
Bureaus and 14 mostly state-owned companies from different 
energy-intensive sectors (steel, power generation, cement, re-
fineries, breweries, petrochemical). In order to test synergies of 
voluntary agreements with other instruments to improve en-
ergy efficiency, the possibilities to use the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) as finance mechanism were also explored 
in a sub-activity of the project. In the following sections, the 
drivers for voluntary agreements, the contents (targets and pro-
cedures) of the agreements and the possibility to finance imple-
mentation through the CDM are discussed in more detail.
DRIVERS FOR VOLUNTARY ACTION
European research on voluntary agreements showed that driv-
ers behind voluntary agreements are not only related to envi-
ronmental problems but also to policy design within a given 
institutional framework and policy culture (Mol et al., 2000; 
Dalkmann et al., 2005). The analysis1 of the three pilot cities 
shows that the rationale behind voluntary agreements in China 
is essentially the same as in the EU – employing a flexible in-
strument to overcome complex environmental problems that 
are not easily tackled by regulation. However, two main drivers 
have been identified that are specific to the Chinese situation: 
(1) Overcoming the implementation gap of the 11th five-year 
plan and (2) closing the power divide between government and 
industry (see Eichhorst and Bongardt (forthcoming) for a de-
tailed discussion of drivers).
Firstly and in contrast to many voluntary agreements in the 
EU, due to the different institutional and political setting in 
China, voluntary agreements are not applied in order to avoid 
regulation but to implement the ambitious national targets. 
This only turned out during the project lifetime. In the begin-
ning of the project during a feasibility study in 2004 (Nanjing 
EPB, 2005), more ambitious environmental protection was the 
aim of the EPB in Nanjing. The introduction of the 11th five-
year plan and its target to reduce energy intensity by 20% from 
2005 until 2010, however, put ambitious mandatory targets in 
place that were subsequently broken down to the provincial 
level. For Jiangsu Province the target was set at 20% equal to 
the national level. So, voluntary agreements are now used to 
ensure implementation of provincial targets. Furthermore, the 
recently amended Energy Conservation Law, which introduced 
the achievement of energy intensity targets into annual per-
formance evaluations of local cadres, as well as requirements 
by parent companies pose a permanent threat of underper-
formance both for local administrations and companies. Using 
negotiated agreements as implementation tool also lessens the 
need for additional threats and incentives. Nonetheless, partici-
pating companies are offered prioritised access to environmen-
tal funds and increased reputation through an Environmental 
Company award, which showed to have a strong motivating 
power. The environmental fund is financed via pollution fees 
collected by EPBs; its money is spent on projects that improve 
environmental performance in industry.
Secondly, in contrast to EU experiences, where the more or 
less equal playing field of industry and national government is 
seen as one success factor of voluntary agreements (Mol et al., 
2000), for instance in the Netherlands, government is much 
more powerful than industry in China. Nevertheless analysis of 
the empirical data from Nanjing revealed that instead of ham-
pering voluntary agreement development, closing the power 
divide represents a major driver for industry to enter into 
voluntary agreements. The cooperative approach of voluntary 
agreements gives industry more say in target setting than tra-
ditional top-down policy making and lends an ear to industry 
concerns, while at the same time supporting enterprises in their 
1. The analysis is based on empirical findings from interviews with industry and 
government representatives involved in the pilot agreements in Nanjing, as well as 
representatives of national government, a foreign development agency and NGOs. 
A total of 14 semi-structured interviews with local companies, decision-makers and 
experts on the national level were conducted for this case study in summer 2007 
(Eichhorst and Bongardt, forthcoming).
Figure 2. The Process of the Energy Potential Scan. 
Source: own illustration.
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implementation. This new partnership approach, increasing the 
acceptance of energy efficiency and environmental improve-
ments, has the potential to overcome both the institutional and 
policy barriers to implementation by developing new spaces of 
communication and dialogue between EPBs (environmental 
protection) and industry (economic development). It must be 
kept in mind, however, that what was found true for energy in-
tensive state-owned industry may not be the same with private 
companies that are not closely tied to the government. 
TARGET SETTING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Much emphasis was put on process management applying a 
cooperative approach throughout. Each enterprise put together 
a so-called Energy Action Team for voluntary agreement devel-
opment and implementation. Energy Action Teams conducted 
Energy Potential Scans (EPS) in cooperation with a Dutch ex-
pert to identify energy saving potentials and possible measures 
to realize them (see figure 2). In the pilots the EPS also included 
a scan of pollution reduction options. On this basis, achievable 
targets were agreed and a detailed action plan developed. This 
procedural innovation helped to create a sense of ownership in 
the companies and assigned clear responsibilities. A first evalu-
ation is scheduled for April 2009.
During the EPS both options for technical and management 
improvements are assessed and their energy saving or pollution 
reduction potential roughly estimated. At the same time, saving 
potentials are categorised by the degree of maturity of a saving 
option in a given industrial sector, as well as the estimated pay-
back time (PBT) of each option (illustrated in table 1).
Based on these categorisations targets were agreed for each 
company and formulated in an action plan including a detailed 
description of energy saving and pollution reduction measures. 
Measures are differentiated into managerial and technical 
measures. Managerial measures are cross-sectoral and include 
trainings of operators and managers, energy audits or the intro-
duction of new managerial systems. Many employed technical 
options are also cross-sectoral, such as waste heat and waste 
water recovery, improved fan technology, improved cooling 
systems or fuel switch, e.g. from oil to gas. Other employed 
measures are sector-specific, such as optimizing cement kilns 
and transmission lines, desulphurisation in the coal and power 
industry or improved painting systems in the automobile in-
dustry. 
In Nanjing, agreed targets are in the range of a 3-5% reduc-
tion in energy intensity by 2009 over a 2007 baseline. Emission 
and pollution reductions vary more widely between compa-
nies.
The aggregated savings and pollution reductions envisaged 
by the 14 companies are represented in table 22.
FINANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS AND EMISSION 
REDUCTIONS
Target setting is closely related to economic feasibility of certain 
measures and therefore with finance options. In this context, 
we also looked at the possibilities and constraints to use the 
CDM as finance instrument in combination with voluntary 
agreements. Analysing the compatibility of voluntary agree-
ments and the CDM, we found that significant procedural 
synergies exist between the two instruments. Both need to 
define a baseline (albeit according to different criteria), set an 
energy efficiency or emission reduction target, respectively, 
develop a timeline and implementation schedule, secure fi-
nance and monitor and evaluate project progress. As concerns 
regulatory compatibility, good housekeeping3 measures alone, 
which can contribute to voluntary agreement targets, will not 
be compatible with the CDM. Good housekeeping measures 
tend to be inexpensive and self-financing and do not usually 
fulfil the CDM requirement of being additional, i.e. that they 
could not have been implemented without the CDM. Rather, 
2. Reduction of SOx and NOx: The wide range is explained by a 90% reduction 
of sulphur emissions in the two companies that installed desulphurisation systems 
for the first time.
3.  This includes management improvements, such as implementing ISO 14001 
or cleaner production auditing.
Table 1. EPS results from the petrochemical sector showing energy efficiency improvement potentials by category and payback time (PBT)
Table 2. Overall targets agreed by 14 companies in Nanjing, Xian and Kelamayi
PBT 




> 5 years 
Total 
Category A: Technologically proven in this industrial sector 1% 1% 1% 3% 
Category B: Technologically proven in other industrial sectors 1% 2% 2% 5% 
Category C: R&D pilot option still to be demonstrated 1% 2% 2% 5% 
Total 3% 5% 5% 13% 
Total Annual Energy Saving 10–18 PJ (3-5%)
Total Annual Reduction of CO2-emissions 1.1–2.0 Mt (3-5%) 
Total Annual Reduction of Waste Water 62–93 Mt 
Total Annual Reduction of Solid Waste 0.26–0.45 Mt 
Reduction of SOx and NOx 3-90% 
PANEL 5: ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND INDUSTRY
%#%%%  35--%2 345$9 s ACT! INNOVATE! DELIVER! REDUCING ENERGY DEMAND SUSTAINABLY 1043 
5012 BONGARDT, EICHHORST
the CDM can be used to finance certain technology and process 
improvements towards higher energy efficiency and emission 
reductions. However, if a CDM project were to be linked to a 
voluntary agreement, the CDM feasibility assessment should be 
carried out by the Energy Action Team of the voluntary agree-
ment in parallel to the Energy Potential Scan. If a CDM project 
was found feasible, including a formal CDM provision in the 
voluntary agreement is crucial in order to ensure additionality 
of the CDM project.
Since VA targets will always be limited by the feasibility of 
potential energy efficiency measures, the CDM could function 
as one possible means to achieve higher targets by increasing 
the cost effectiveness of certain energy efficiency measures 
through additional CER revenues (in other words decreasing 
the payback time of an investment). Whether or not a CDM 
project activity is integrated into a voluntary agreement should 
be carefully considered. The benefits of additional finance flows 
for certain energy efficiency or emission reduction activities 
and the additional administrative burdens and risks posed by 
the CDM process have to be weighed up. In some cases, a com-
bined approach of the CDM and VAs can be mutually rein-
forcing: While the CDM may support VA financing, voluntary 
agreements can draw the attention of the company’s executive 
management to the opportunities of CDM project activities. 
However, depending on the kind of measures and available 
CDM methodologies, it may be more suitable to look for other 
sources of finance. 
As mentioned above, in the Nanjing case priority access to 
environmental funds from Nanjing Environmental Protection 
Bureau is granted to participating companies as incentive for 
voluntary agreements. 
Conclusions for Transfer of Energy Efficiency 
Policy
No policy exists in a vacuum and so energy efficiency policy, 
too, has to reflect local institutional and political realities to be 
successful. A different institutional fit and notorious implemen-
tation gaps of national laws and regulations in China required 
that pilot negotiated agreements be adapted to these needs. Po-
litical developments during the project lifetime, making ambi-
tious energy efficiency improvements mandatory through the 
11th five-year plan, changed the objective of voluntary agree-
ments in Nanjing from setting ambitious targets to ensuring 
implementation of ambitious targets. At the same time, using 
voluntary agreements as implementation tool showed to have 
the potential to overcome limitations of traditional top-down 
policies in China by providing not only specific aims but also 
assisting with the concrete measures to achieve them. Here the 
formation of Energy Action Teams and the EPS proved to be 
suitable tools as they helped to create a sense of ownership in the 
companies and assigned clear responsibilities. At the same time 
the cooperative approach offered active, methodological sup-
port in concrete measures. By lifting industry on a more equal 
power level with government authorities, voluntary agreements 
made energy efficiency and environmental improvements ac-
ceptable to and manageable by participating companies and 
thus showed to be an effective policy instrument to overcome 
traditional institutional constraints to environmental policy 
implementation at the local level in China.
In conclusion we found that although the concrete objec-
tive of voluntary agreements changed from an instrument to 
achieve higher-than-required energy efficiency improvements 
to an implementation tool for national/provincial targets, the 
rationale behind the agreements remained essentially the same 
as in the EU – employing a flexible instrument to overcome 
complex environmental problems that are not easily tackled by 
(only) issuing a regulation.
A similar trend can be seen in the introduction of a na-
tional programme to improve energy efficiency in China’s 
most energy-intensive enterprises (the Top-1000 Enterprises 
Programme). Although, the Top-1000 Enterprises Programme 
is modelled on voluntary agreements, here the National De-
velopment and Reform Commission set the targets for par-
ticipating companies unilaterally (Price and Wang, 2007). So, 
again, instead of being a voluntary agreement in the very sense 
of the word, rather its elements are employed as implementa-
tion tool. 
Recent developments of government documents embrac-
ing voluntary agreements as innovative policy instrument, the 
success of the first pilot agreements in Shandong (Hu, 2007) 
and the introduction of the Top-1000 Enterprises Programme 
all paint a positive picture for further voluntary agreements in 
China. Whether or not they will all be wearing a new skin as 
implementation instrument remains as yet to be seen. 
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